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THE INTERLEGALITY OF
TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW
ROBERT WAI*
I
PRIVATE LAW AND THE PLURAL
NORMATIVE ORDERS OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
This article describes transnational private law as a decentralized and
intermediate form of transnational governance that recognizes and manages the
multiplicity of norms generated by plural normative systems in our
contemporary world society. These include international and municipal state
systems, nonstate social systems, and private ordering by parties. Consistent
with an approach that views globalization as changing the nature of the
sovereignty of states,1 the article draws on the rich tradition of private law,
considered with its international dimensions, to find both a concrete example of
and a model for understanding the complex role of the state in the plural
normative orders of the “postnational constellation.”2 In this task, this article
views private law understood in its international context as exemplary of an
intermediate level of transnational governance.3
With a focus on the plural normative orders of international business
transactions, the article discusses how transnational private law4 addresses the
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1. See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
(1996) (describing challenges posed by globalization for fundamental principles of the modern state).
2. See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION (2001).
3. Transnational governance is defined as including “various and untraditional types of
international and regional collaboration among both public and private actors.” TRANSNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM ix (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004). The task of linking
private international law with transnational governance is here identified with Christian Joerges; his
work is acknowledged and discussed in Robert Wai, Conflicts and Comity in Transnational Governance:
Private International Law as Mechanism and Metaphor for the Relationship Among the Plural Orders of
Transnational Social Regulation, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND
SOCIAL REGULATION 229, 247–51 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2006).
4. In this article, transnational private law is understood primarily as the combination of domestic
private laws and private international law. Transnational law is often more expansively defined to
include a broad range of norms including, for example, public international law, national public laws,
and the rules of nonstate organizations like corporations. See, e.g., Philip C. Jessup, TRANSNATIONAL
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limits of theoretical understandings of global business norms informed by global
legal pluralism. Not only is transnational private law one important normative
regime of international business, but it is also identified as providing a good
analytical model for understanding the interrelationship among plural norms. In
contrast to leading accounts of global business relations, this article’s account of
transnational private law emphasizes the plural character of each of the
multiple legal regimes of international business, whether state law or nonstate
law. Connected with that plural character of state and nonstate normative
orders, this model describes a view of the normative interrelationship not
simply as a place of harmonization, but also as a place of productive normative
contestation.
Transnational private law is used as a frame to consider private
international law together with private law.5 An appreciation of private law as
concerned with the relationship among plural and transnational normative
orders is obscured because subjects of private law and private international law
are typically considered separately.6 When viewed together, a sense of the longestablished task for private law of relating normative orders that challenge state
boundaries becomes clearer.
Viewing transnational private law in this way, the connection among private
law, global legal pluralism, and transnational governance of business relations is
made clearer. The concept of transnational governance posits that, in our
“partially globalized world,”7 a multiplicity of often overlapping forms of crossborder and subnational governance, including state and nonstate forms, creates
governance beyond traditional state models but short of world government.
Transnational private law plays a significant role in global business, whether
through the facilitation of international business transactions or through the
regulation of such transactions by transnational private litigation or by
regulatory standards included as terms of private international contracts. This

LAW 1–16 (1956). Such a concept of transnational law is too broad for the focus of this article on the
role of private laws; for further discussion, see Robert Wai, Transnational Private Law and Private
Ordering in a Contested Global Society, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 471, 471–72 (2005).
5. In this article, private law means state laws such as contract law, tort law, and property law.
Private international law means state laws related to issues of jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition of enforcement of judgments, in private-law disputes with connections to more than one
legal jurisdiction. This article is premised on the value of viewing these two kinds of law together, as
further discussed infra IV.
6. In North America, private-law subjects are treated as core first-year law-school topics; private
international law is almost inevitably an upper-year, elective course. Courses in the law of international
business transactions are intended to cover the range of different kinds of relevant laws, including some
reference to both private law and private international law. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS : A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK (Ralph H. Folsom et al. eds., 7th ed. 2004). In
treating so many topics, the risk is that a refined sense of the private-international-law regime (or any
other single regime) is lost, even in the most sophisticated socio-legal accounts; for example, there is
little discussion of private international law in the excellent volume by JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER
DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000). Equally important, the interrelationship among
these multiple kinds of global business norms is often poorly articulated.
7. ROBERT KEOHANE, POWER AND GOVERNANCE IN A PARTIALLY GLOBALIZED WORLD
(2002).
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function for transnational private law endures because most global economic
activity remains embedded in configurations of state laws and institutions.8 In
this sense, both state and nonstate normative orders related to international
business remain plural regimes; there is no complete separation of either the
state or the nonstate orders. If that is the case, the regulatory function of private
law in a global era includes the subtle task of coordinating both state and
nonstate normative orders. By foregrounding the centrality of both state and
nonstate norms, private law provides a useful corrective to a tendency in
doctrinal-law scholarship to focus on state norms, and the tendency in leading
works of global legal pluralism to emphasize nonstate normative orders.
Finally, in addition to its role as an important governance regime of world
society, transnational private law provides a model for understanding the
interaction among state and nonstate normative systems more generally in a
world of global legal pluralism. A focus on transnational private law recognizes
the plural nature of governing norms, and then addresses the interrelationship
among those plural systems of norms. In this respect, transnational private law
exemplifies the concept of interlegality described by Boaventura de Sousa
Santos as the “different legal spaces superimposed, interpenetrated and mixed
in our minds, as much as in our actions, either on occasions of qualitative leaps
or sweeping crises in our life trajectories, or in the dull routine of eventless
everyday life.”9
This article advances a distinct view of interlegality, emphasizing that with
plural orders one should expect an interrelationship of normative contestation
as much as an interrelationship of harmonization or unification. Transnational
private law as transnational governance highlights that some degree of
contestation and conflict is the legitimate function of law as a place for
disputation. The legitimacy of private law indeed comes importantly from that
role: law, including private law, is not only about the efficient facilitation of
transactions. It also is related to how individual actors in our global society can
disagree about the right thing to be done in a particular transaction and to seek
financial compensation and deterrence, for example, to stop a polluting plant or
bad work practices. In addition, through the public functions of state processes,
private-law disputes can publicize contestable behavior in the broader society.
This communication can also involve contestation at a more general ideational
level of policies advanced by business or by state, or efforts to reframe public
debate about the relative priority among goals such as regulation, distribution,
and efficiency.10

8. This embeddedness is clearly uneven in terms of its locational distribution. See, e.g., Saskia
Sassen, The State and Globalization, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 91 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas Biersteker eds., 2002).
9. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE 437 (2d ed.
2002).
10. The ideational function of private law is discussed further in Wai, supra note 4, at 481–84.
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II
BUSINESS NORMS IN AN ERA OF GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM
Global legal pluralism offers an excellent conceptual frame for
understanding normative contestation across and among the different state and
nonstate normative orders of contemporary global society. Striking analyses
have been provided that highlight the challenge associated with the growth of
multiple normative orders in the current global society. For instance, the
account of interlegality quoted above comes from Santos’s pathbreaking work
on global legal pluralism.
However, leading accounts of global pluralism have so far not provided the
tools to fully capture the nature of the interrelationship among these different
orders. Two leading accounts of global legal pluralism in the business context by
Santos and Gunther Teubner illustrate the challenge in modeling the
relationship of this complex normative terrain. Whereas both provide brilliant
descriptions of the existence of plural orders, and both recognize issues of
interlegality,11 both fail to provide a full account of the interpenetration,
overlap, and linkage among different normative orders in the business context.
More careful attention to the role of private law, particularly in connection with
private international law, offers a corrective to these accounts and may signal a
way forward in understanding the coexistence of, and complex normative
relationship among, the multiple state and nonstate orders of global legal
pluralism.
A. Business Norms in Postmodern Global Society
The normative framework for contemporary business transactions is clearly
varied, including state laws, public international law, private international law,
and various normative orders associated primarily with nonstate institutions or
private ordering. The observation that the terrain of global business law is
plural is consistent with traditional approaches both to the field of the law of
international business transactions and to leading socio-legal analyses of global
business.12 However, it has proved difficult to model how the normative aspects
of such a plural terrain for global business fit together. Global legal pluralism
would seem to offer a good theory for this task.13
The early and leading work on globalization of law by Boaventura de Sousa
Santos illustrates the broad challenge for constructing a new legal common
11. An earlier version of the passage from Santos concerning interlegality is cited with approval in
GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 107 (1993).
12. See generally BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 6.
13. For an informative use of legal pluralism in the analysis of issues of jurisdiction and
globalization, see Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2005);
see also Ralf Michaels, The Re-state-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the
Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209 (2005) (discussing pluralism and
private international law). In contrast with the Berman and Michaels articles, the focus of this article is
more on how a consideration of legal pluralism can illuminate issues of interlegality among plural
orders, especially when combined with an examination of underlying state private law.
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sense in a world society that has seen the growth of multiple normative orders
associated with globalization. Santos argues that global legal scholarship should
shift attention from “the somewhat sterile debate about relative weight of
transnational and national factors to a more promising one on the increasing
internal heterogeneization of state regulation.”14 Santos identifies an expansive
and diverse array of contemporary emergent legal fields including European
law, lex mercatoria, migration, human rights, and jus humanitatis. In his
influential conceptualization, Santos classifies forms of globalization as
hegemonic globalization from above—in the forms of globalizing localisms and
localizing globalisms—and counter-hegemonic globalization from below,
including subaltern cosmopolitanism and the common heritage of mankind.15
He advocates for the development of a cosmopolitan legality arising out of the
counter-hegemonic forces, represented, for example, in social movements such
as human-rights networks.16
Santos is clear that this is a theoretical conceptualization and that in practice
the forms of globalization are more cross-cutting and intertwined.17 However, a
weakness in this conceptualization is that his survey of plural orders tends to
result in flattened, simplified accounts of each particular order and in an
unfortunate segregation of the analysis of the different kinds of orders. This is
especially evident in his discussion of global business law, with its focus on lex
mercatoria.18
Santos is caught up with the idea of lex mercatoria as “global capital’s own
law,”19 evidencing a globalized localism of laws helpful to the capital interests of
the North. In his account, lex mercatoria arises from the needs and practices of
transnational commercial and corporate actors and their supporting institutions
to create a “deterritorialized set of normative principles and rules,” including
norms aimed at “circumventing submission to national laws and to the
traditional conflict of laws.”20 The lex mercatoria is sustained by a global legal
culture exemplified by global (especially U.S. corporate) law firms and
international commercial arbitration.21 In his analysis, it is nonstate lex
mercatoria that is as likely to drive state law as vice-versa, as in the protection of
private-property interests through state laws.22
In emphasizing the singularity of the lex mercatoria, especially as a force of
hegemonic globalization, Santos fails to situate it within the broad array of state
public and private laws that regulate business law, such as competition policy or
tort law. Santos mentions the role of private law only in passing, through a
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

SANTOS, supra note 9, at 199.
Id. at 179–82.
Id. at 180–82, 458–93.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 206–15.
SANTOS, supra note 9, at 208.
Id. at 209–10.
Id. at 212–14.
Id. at 211–12.
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reference to private international law as a competing system developed by
states to deal with growth of earlier lex mercatoria.23 Contrary to his concept of
interlegality, Santos does not consider the degree to which many nonstate
norms are reflected in or reflect state-law norms, nor does he attend to the
complexity of the heterogeneous nature of merchant practice itself.24 Nor does
he note that relevant business contracts, including standard form contracts,
refer to state-law norms as well as to nonstate norms.25
The resulting account of the lex mercatoria is unfamiliar to any business
actor or business lawyer operating in the current international sphere. Santos
notes the suspicion of common-law lawyers with respect to accounts of lex
mercatoria, which he thinks odd given the reputation of the common law for
attending to legal practice.26 But it is as plausible to argue that attention to
actual practice explains the skepticism of common lawyers toward expansive
claims for the lex mercatoria.27
Santos moves on, however, to elaborate a variety of other forms of global
legal fields, including the human-rights regime, migration law, and commonheritage regimes. But, again, the problem is that these are set up as
countervailing, separate normative orders, rather than interpenetrating orders.
This reduces the utility of the analysis for a field such as the law of international
business transactions.
B. Systems Theory and Global Merchant Law Without the State
Systems theory seems ideal for better understanding the normative
functions of transnational private law because it focuses on the plural nature of
normative orders in contemporary society and because it views social systems as
centrally about communications.28 Its focus on the internal self-understanding of
social systems is a welcome advance for rigorously analyzing the normative
character of nonstate social systems and for identifying connections and
conflicts among different normative orders. However, systems accounts
ultimately emphasize the closed, autopoietic nature of social systems, which
rejects an internal perspective on normative orders that is itself a pluralist one.

23. Id. at 209.
24. To recognize the role of private law, one need not argue against some concept of hegemonic
globalization. Santos could plausibly have used his own frame of global localisms to trace the projection
of private-law values from influential state systems like New York or the United Kingdom, rather than
an amorphous set of nonstate lex mercatoria. Such a global localism could be a tool of competing state
interests or of private interests.
25. See Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 447 (2007).
26. SANTOS, supra note 9, at 213.
27. A similar response to the skepticism toward lex mercatoria among actual practitioners is found
in a leading volume on the subject, KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE
LEX MERCATORIA 5–6 (1999).
28. See generally NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS (John Bedmarz & Dirk Baecker trans.,
1995).
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Consistent with pluralism, systems theorists observe the growth of various
kinds of nonstate-based social systems in modern society. A starting premise of
systems analysis based on “second-order” observation is that social practices,
rather than an abstract or ideal theory of law, determine the boundaries of
normative systems. Thus, the boundaries of social systems are based on the
criteria used by the social system itself. This kind of openness to the normative
content of social systems, therefore, includes an opening to social systems
broader than state legal regimes.
In contemporary global society, Gunther Teubner argues that the normative
orders associated with each of these emergent functional systems—of
international business practice, of multinational corporations, of human-rights
communities, of ecological networks—are as significant as nation-state legal
regimes.29 These systems generate, through a process of autopoiesis, closed
communicative codes of legality and thereby challenge any conception of global
law premised on primacy of existing state orders. More recently, FischerLescano and Teubner argue that this fragmentation of global society also limits
any efforts in public international law to find unity and harmonization based on
traditional state-law forms.30 Such a view of the primacy of nonstate orders in
global society resonates with analyses from a political-economy perspective that
identify the dramatic rise of private authority in the transnational business
area.31
In his provocative 1997 argument, Teubner observes that global functional
differentiation is occurring such that state legal systems are being replaced by
autopoietic social systems, “global law without a state,” which use (a) a binary
code of legal–illegal and (b) reproduction by a symbol of global (not national)
validity.32 The primary example that Teubner references is the lex mercatoria
founded on a basis of a self-validating (and paradoxical) contract. From the
founding contract, as stabilized through increasingly elaborate structures of
hierarchy, temporalization, and externalization,33 the lex mercatoria produces
the operative closure required for an autopoietic system, even if the system
remains vulnerable to the economic exigencies of its coupled economic regime,
is episodic in character, and relies much on “soft law.” Teubner does not
emphasize the connection between perceptions in the system of the validity of
the contract and the potential enforcement of the contract in any state system;
rather, he emphasizes that the system simply accepts the contract as its
foundation and resolves the “paradox of a self-validating contract” through the

29. Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW
WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
30. Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999, 1007–08 (2003–2004).
31. See, e.g., A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY (2003).
32. Teubner, supra note 29, at 17.
33. Id. at 15–17.
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articulation of merchant norms, lex mercatoria, and private dispute resolution,
most obviously commercial arbitration.34
The 1997 argument demonstrates in a concentrated way the tendency in
social-systems analysis to push sociological foundations to extremes of
characterization. Teubner starts with the reasonable observation that there may
be multiple kinds of law at work: what he refers to as political, legal, and social
law production. But his understanding of fragmented globalization gives
“different relative weights” to different norm productions.35 In particular, global
economic law is understood as a “highly asymmetric process of legal selfreproduction.”36 He notes that one can identify numerous phenomena that, “in
accordance with traditional positivist theories—have a clearly national and
international basis,” such as national commercial codes or the UN Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.37 But his account nonetheless
proceeds to excessively focus on the singularity of the nonstate side of the
business regulatory order. He refers to the “lex mercatoria propria.”38 Through
this term, which is not commonly used even in the specialized lex mercatoria
literature, Teubner purges the practice of any impure elements. Even the
shadow of state law disappears from a role in this system.
Respecting both the dispute-settlement procedure of arbitration and the
substantive governing law of lex mercatoria, Teubner’s account of the role of
the state is purified to include the single emphasis on the self-validating
contract, in which in turn there apparently is no reference to (or expectation of)
state process, state law, or even bargaining in the shadow of state law.39
Contract, whether deferred to by state law or, after some point, automatically
understood as constitutive in its own right by parties, becomes both the moment
of connection to established state law and its moment of separation. This is a
memorable moment, but one that is also fraught. Most obviously, this account
fails to explain the role of either public regulation or private law, such as tort
law, in protecting and intruding interests of third parties from the effects of
these consensual relations. Even as between contractual parties, as elaborated
below, state law and process remains present in constituting the private
ordering between contractual parties. With respect to contractual dispute
settlement, the analysis obscures the role of state law in sustaining the
procedures of arbitration.
This partial account mutates what the actual law merchant, in the sense of
norms followed by business actors and their advisors, is about. “Second-order
observation” is supposed to allow legal practices—rather than, for example, an
34. Id. at 15–19.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Id.
37. Teubner, supra note 29, at 12.
38. Id.
39. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing the role of law in providing a framework for divorce
negotiations and settlements outside of the courtroom).
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abstracted, pure legal theory—to decide the boundaries of law. Most observers
would see that transnational business actors do not engage in the use of a purely
a-national lex mercatoria propria—whether customary norms or contractual
norms—in isolation from the state system.40 Teubner notes the vehement
rejection of theories of lex mercatoria by “mainly British and American
lawyers” who seem rather attached to the importance in practice of
sovereignty.41 He dismisses this skepticism as reflecting a kind of false
consciousness related to “a legal world still conceptually dominated by the
nation-state.”42 But if the actual practitioners disbelieve the account of a pure
nonstate lex mercatoria, should not second-order observation attend?
III
THE COMPLEX NORMATIVE CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
A. Plural Normative Expectations in International Business
The skepticism of legal practitioners concerning lex mercatoria, let alone a
lex mercatoria propria, suggests that there has been no autopoietic separation of
normative expectations of transnational business actors of the kind imagined by
systems theory. Clearly, significant norms are generated in nonstate sources,
whether through contracts, particular trades, or more institutionalized nonstate
venues such as the International Chamber of Commerce.43 But business actors
continue to expect a blend of state and nonstate norms, and state and nonstate
processes, including for dispute settlement.
This state of normative expectations aligns with accounts of complex
“affective relationships” in an era of multiculturalism and globalization.44 Norms
correlate to underlying material conditions involving substantial overlap among
different social networks. The overlaps are various. There is significant
sociological and normative overlap between state and nonstate systems. There
also remains significant overlap in both membership and subject matter among
different functional systems such as business and labor networks. In addition,
functional systems may be cross-cut by nonstate-based ethnicities and

40. Even leading advocates of lex mercatoria rely on state sources to bolster the plausibility of its
reality and its relevance; for example, see the discussion of the “creeping codification” concept in
BERGER, supra note 27.
41. Teubner, supra note 29, at 10.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce, Official Rules for the Interpretation of Trade
Terms, ICC Publication No. 560 (2000) [hereinafter ICC, Incoterms]; International Chamber of
Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, ICC Publication No. 600 (2007)
[hereinafter ICC, UCP].
44. Roderick A. Macdonald, Access to Justice in Canada Today: Scope, Sale and Ambitions, in
ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR A NEW CENTURY: THE WAY FORWARD 19 (Julia Bass et al. eds., 2005).
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nationalities, such as transnational Chinese or Jewish business networks, further
complicating the blend of norms in play.45
In countering an excessive focus on state law, pluralist accounts of global
business should not ascribe to nonstate norms a fixed facticity that denies either
the reality of concurrent normative systems or the contested and open-textured
nature of any particular normative system.46 This is a constant risk that pluralist
work in anthropology has addressed.47 Such an account of plural and contested
norms also seems necessary to reflect sophisticated contemporary accounts of
identity and culture, in which national, ethnic, and professional identities
matter, but are plural, complex, dynamic, and the subject of critical struggle.48
B. Interlegality and Normative Contestation
In the contemporary global order, participants in any particular order are
more likely to be aware of the multiplicity of potentially competing normative
systems, and, if so, it can be said that in a plural transnational society, normative
systems operate in the shadow of each other.49 If this is the state of normative
expectations, a better model of global legal pluralism is captured in the idea of
interlegality identified by Santos, although not applied by him in his discussion
of global business norms.
When there is awareness of multiple normative systems, there is also greater
sense among participants of the possibility of overlap and conflict, and thereby
a recognition of the contested nature of any single normative order. This in turn
helps to reinforce the insights identified by critical legal theory that the
normative code of any particular social system is rife with contradictions, gaps,
and ambiguities.50 Similarly, the overlap in membership reinforces the possibility

45. See generally RULES AND NETWORKS: THE LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 325–420 (Richard Appelbaum et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the role of Chinese guanxi
networks in international business transactions); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 140–42 (1992)
(describing how diamond merchants opt out of the legal system by creating an alternative system based
on ties that include homogenous-group-based extralegal contractual regimes among Jewish merchants);
JANET LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY: BEYOND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
OF ETHNIC TRADING NETWORKS, CONTRACT LAW, AND GIFT-EXCHANGE (1994) (analyzing ethnic
trading networks from the perspective of new institutional economics).
46. See Jeremy Webber, Legal Pluralism and Human Agency, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 167 (2006)
(providing a conception of legal pluralism attentive to human disagreement).
47. See Sally Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 875–76 (1988). In the colonial
context, anthropologists have demonstrated that the received or constructed account of local law and
norms was simplified, including through the lens of western ideas about legal coherence. See generally,
e.g., SALLY FALK MOORE, SOCIAL FACTS & FABRICATIONS: “CUSTOMARY” LAW ON KILIMANJARO,
1880–1980 (1986).
48. AFTER IDENTITY xviii–xix (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle eds., 1995); see also JAMES
CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE (1988) (tracing the contested and hybrid nature of
culture in the twentieth century).
49. See Merry, supra note 47, at 880–86; Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private
Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 23–24 (1981).
50. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon
Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 94–95 (2000).
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of collisions of functional rationalities and policy priorities that strain the
credibility of the idea of a single shared code of legality or normativity.51
Individual members become carriers of different mixes of norms from system to
system, constantly testing dominant norms of each system by providing
argumentative bite to latent or minority normative strands within each order.
Moreover, awareness of interlegality and the plural nature of a society in any
particular normative order—whether state law, custom, religion, or merchant
practice—counters the tendency toward normative closure.
Normative contestation should be viewed as an important function for
transnational law, not simply a problem that is in need of resolution. This runs
counter to strong tendencies in contemporary private law favoring decisional
harmony and the efficient facilitation of commerce as the goal of international
trade and business law.52 The norm of contestation is a deeply social
commitment and a normal part of most societies.53 Room for such contestation
is a means in many legal systems for achieving regulatory goals—for example,
to correct for problems of externalities on third parties. But more broadly,
contestation allows normative challenges to be made, reflecting tensions
between different values of the normative order; such contestation can be an
important foundation for a legitimate political order based on the competition
and deliberation among different norms.
Venues for contestation are especially important transnationally because of
regulatory and governance gaps that exist in our global society.54 For example,
transnational private litigation in state courts can provide an opportunity to
seek retribution and compensation, to make arguments, to publicize bad
conduct, and generally to contest behavior of private actors, such as
multinational corporations that engage in cross-border conduct. This kind of
contestation is needed to address governance gaps opened up in the
international order where many problems are globalized but political and legal
forms remain primarily situated in the nation-state, where national
governments tend to be parochial in their regulatory focus, and where

51. See Gunther Teubner, Altera Pars Audiatur: Law in the Collision of Discourses, in LAW,
SOCIETY AND ECONOMY: CENTENARY ESSAYS FOR THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND
POLITICAL SCIENCE 1895–1995 149, 152 (Richard Rawlings ed., 1997) (identifying discourses of
“politicisation, moralisation, scientification and economisation”).
52. In the field of private international law, see, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Recognition of Foreign
Judgments as a Trade Law Issue: The Economics of Private International Law, in ECONOMIC
DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 592 (Jagdeep S. Bahnadari & Alan O. Sykes eds., 1997);
MICHAEL J. WHINCOP & MARY KEYES, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(2001) (adopting an economic approach to conflict of laws).
53. See, e.g., LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROJECTS 117–67
(2002) (contesting the ideology of the “harmony legal model”). Nader observes that in many societies
“disputing may be a means to harmony and to autonomy and self-determination; and conflict may be
part of the struggle in life that keeps people bound together.” Id. at 125. For two further examples
taken from very different contexts, see ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001) and ROBERT A. KAGAN, LAWSUITS AND LITIGANTS IN CASTILLE
1500–1700 (1981).
54. See Wai, supra note 4, at 478–81.
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international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, are only
weakly empowered to address the full range of cross-border problems that arise
in a global society. Such contestation through private law can also be
understood as serving a communicative function in advancing broader policy
debates in the global context; for example, high-profile litigation cases
concerning foreign business conduct related to environmental or human rights,
such as in extraction industries in Sudan, Burma, or Ecuador, can help to raise
general issues about corporate social responsibility in a global context.55
Attention to a more open and complex account of transnational normative
systems may also be a route toward social solidarity beyond the nation-state.56
Systems-theory accounts of law are sometimes interpreted as examples of
movement beyond old public–private distinctions of state law to a “transparent
and democratic process of constant, free and open interaction among
singularities, which through their communication produces common norms.”57
However, as Jurgen Habermas notes, autopoietic accounts of social systems
ultimately share the challenge of social theories comprised only of individual
rational-choice actors, namely “[t]he total absence of any intersubjectively
shared values, norms or processes of understanding.”58 The focus in this article
is on the way in which plural normative orders are often internally plural and
interlegal and are further linked by cross-cutting membership. Though perhaps
falling short of a community of interest, one consequence of intertwined
normative orders is the creation of possibilities for productive contestation
within and across those orders. In such an account, conflict of norms is viewed
less as a problem in need of resolution; contestation instead becomes a normal
part of building the legitimate foundations for a global society.
C. Normative Conflict in Plural Orders and the Role of the State
Structurally, the nature of a dispute will push parties to find alternative
argumentative veins in any normative tradition. Where there is overlapping
membership, this tendency is reinforced as actors will constantly be looking to
avoid normative closure and seek recourse outside of any single social system,
including state laws. The same impulse will push parties toward “forumshopping” in the sense of both venue and substantive law.59 Forum-shopping,
overlapping jurisdiction, and governing laws are of course familiar to conflictof-laws scholars and practitioners, although usually they are characterized as

55. See Craig Scott & Robert Wai, Transnational Governance of Corporate Conduct Through the
Migration of Human Rights Norms: The Potential Contribution of Transnational Private Litigation, in
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 287 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004).
56. See COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING AND FEELING BEYOND THE NATION (Pheng Cheah & Bruce
Robbins eds., 1998).
57. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, MULTITUDE: WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF
EMPIRE 204, n.125 (2004) (citing Teubner, among others).
58. HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 142.
59. See Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Forum Shopping and Shopping Forums: Dispute Processing
in a Minangkabau Village in West Sumatra, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 117 (1981).
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problems to be solved. From a perspective committed to normative
contestation, there may be reasons to view this consequence and use of
pluralism as positive. In this respect, there are analogies to the turn to
transnational venues and norms practiced by transnational advocacy networks
and international-human-rights actors.60
When there is self-conscious awareness of the plural nature of participants’
memberships, not only is movement among venues possible, but expectations
develop respecting how the different normative systems operate together.
These can include expectations respecting rules on how to choose among
systems or expectations about venues for dispute resolution. In this context, the
state returns to play a significant role.
When disputes as to the mix between different normative systems exist,
disputants expect state courts to play the role of arbiter of questions of
jurisdiction and governing law. Of course, full adjudication in civil courts is the
exception, not the norm, in business disputes.61 Robert Mnookin and Lewis
Kornhauser have identified that bargaining and outcomes often occur in the
“shadow of the law.”62 More generally, Marc Galanter has observed that the
courts provide “a background of norms and procedures against which
negotiations and regulation in both private and governmental settings takes
place.”63 The notion of conduct in the shadow of the law has been foundational
to broader study of alternative dispute resolution, but the insight is more
generally made with respect to legal pluralism.64
In performing this oversight function with respect to disputes, including in
situations where social systems overlap, state legal institutions retain a core role
in a partially globalized world. This oversight function, which may not be
needed or used by parties in every dispute but which remains in the
background, reflects that parties share a general ambivalence toward the state
form, including in a global context. The state appears as “both remedy and
poison” with respect to globalization.65 Populations still look to states to address
problems generated by international markets, flows of people, and security
threats, even as they see that the states are themselves the source of
concentrated violence, inefficiency, corruption, and exclusion of nonresidents.

60. See MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization
of International Human Rights Norms Into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 18–19 (Thomas Risse et al.
eds., 1999) (developing the “spiral model” of interaction of international human-rights norms and
domestic practices, including “boomerang patterns” comprised of efforts by transnational actors to
bypass states and search out external or international sources to pressure states).
61. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61–62 (1963).
62. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 39.
63. Galanter, supra note 49, at 6.
64. Id.
65. Jacques Derrida, Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides, in PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF
TERROR 85, 124 (Giovanna Borradori ed., 2003).
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Santos and others imagine an alternative transnational politics that moves away
from a fixation on the coercive power of the state and focuses on other diverse
forms of politics that spring as much from practices of social contestation.66
However, given the current state of expectations and practice in each of the
different transnational areas of world society, state forms of sovereignty, for all
their problems, often remain the most effective and legitimate forms of dispute
settlement. Transnational governance will need to rely on the maintenance of
roles for both state and nonstate systems in governance.
IV
TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW—VIEWING
PRIVATE LAW AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW TOGETHER
To demonstrate how state and nonstate levels interact in constituting the
normative character of transnational governance, this section considers private
law and private international law together under the rubric of transnational
private law.67 Viewing the two fields together clarifies that private-law systems
have already been very much involved in addressing both state and nonstate
systems of normative ordering in a cross-border context.
A. Private Law and Nonstate Norms
It is impossible to articulate the regulatory function of private international
law without a sense of the regulatory functions of the underlying private laws.68
An awareness of underlying private law is also necessary to recognize private
law’s important function of relating state to nonstate normative orders,
including in a cross-border context.
Private law has long wrestled with the existence of private ordering and
multiple social orders. For example, Eugen Ehrlich viewed commercial law as
exemplary of the living law, which “dominates life itself even though it has not
been posited in legal propositions.”69 He notes of the commercial law that it was
the one branch of law based “not merely incidentally, but throughout on actual
usage.”70 The dynamism of commercial practice constantly pushes beyond the
adjustments to commercial law made by legislator and judge. For example,

66. Alternative regimes premised on a noncoercive politics not based on the state are described,
for example, in the political anthropology of PIERRE CLASTRES, SOCIETY AGAINST THE STATE:
ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1974).
67. See Wai, supra note 4, at 471–72. A similar critique of conflict of laws and its relation to the
substantive law has been made with a very different response of turning to lex mercatoria. See BERGER,
supra note 27, at 10–17, 30.
68. See Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of
Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 209, 232–38 (2002).
69. EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 493 (Walter Moll
trans., reissue 1962).
70. Id.
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Ehrlich notes that, even at his time, the important source of commercial law is
not the judicial decision, but rather the “modern business document.”71
The transnational dimension of commercial-law development is often
underappreciated. Commercial laws have borrowed extensively from private
ordering, customs, and standards developed by merchants engaged in crossborder trade, including in the sale of goods (for example, with respect to
implied terms and to price-delivery terms), carriage of goods (including bills of
lading and maritime insurance), and international payments and finance (bills
of exchange and letters of credit).72 The transnational dimension of private law
is arguably even more influential if one considers the complex global
movements in ideas of law across national systems.73
With the modern rise of nation-states, legislators and judges made efforts to
simultaneously draw significant content from merchant practice into law while
modifying that content to further state interests and concerns.74 Customary
practice was almost always modified as it became common law through
common-law courts or through legislation such as commercial codes. This
“nationalization” process provided state procedures for participants seeking
third-party enforcement through private-law adjudication, but it also introduced
various state considerations, such as constraints on enforcement of private
agreements that were illegal or contrary to public policy.75 This subtle and
delicate balance between customary practice and state policies continues to
characterize private law.
B. The Transnational Private Law of Contract
The complex role of private law in the mediation of private ordering,
including in transnational context, is nowhere more evident than with respect to
contract. Contract law is not typically framed as concerned with the relationship
among plural orders. Instead, contract seems to be about the specific terms and
conditions for enforcement of agreements between individuals involved in
particular transactions. However, significant traditions of contract emphasize
the social and institutional context for contract, such as work on relational

71. Id. at 495.
72. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 6, at 51–52. Cross-border economic
innovations and practice has also pushed the limits of traditional private-law doctrine. For example,
both bills of lading and letters of credit have influenced core common-law doctrines related to privity
and consideration. See ANSON’S LAW OF CONTRACT 421–23 (J. Beatson ed., 27th ed. 1998). Similar
influences on the common law of contract by transnational commercial relations are found with respect
to force majeure and frustration of contract. G.H. TREITEL, FRUSTRATION AND FORCE MAJEURE (2d
ed. 1994).
73. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–1968, 36
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631 (2003) (describing globalizations in the structure of law and legal
consciousness in the periods 1850–1914 and 1900–1968).
74. CUTLER, supra note 31, at 108–41.
75. Id.
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contracts.76 For example, Hugh Collins interprets contractual regulations as
concerned with framing the self-government of social relations between
parties.77 Although social-contract theory may no longer suffice to capture the
political foundations for society in general, contract clearly is used to set both
substantive and procedural rules for governance of particular social relations
and associations. Examples of procedural measures include inspection,
monitoring, outside verification, complaint processes, mediation, and all the
way through to arbitration and dispute settlement. Teubner builds from such
governance features of contract to an autopoietic vision of contract as a “selfreproducing system of communicative interaction between contractual
partners.”78
Contract performs a similar spectrum of governance functions in
international business. Contracts have been the foundation for the arrangement
of core international business transactions, whether they are international sales
or the many kinds of arrangements that surround sales transactions, such as
carriage, insurance, or payment. A typical international-business-transactions
text will identify contract as a central device for managing the potentially
complex multiplicity of kinds of laws and norms related to sales transactions.79 A
broader governance role for contract is more clearly in view in more sustained
forms of business transactions such as investment transactions, in which
contracts like shareholders’ agreements, joint-venture agreements, franchise
agreements, or distribution agreements are core sources of the legal obligations
of relevant parties.
The relation of both sales and investment contracts to plural orders is
highlighted by general contractual clauses that incorporate into the relation an
extensive set of background or default norms developed by a particular social
order. Standard examples are references to the norms of various shipping
associations with respect to maritime insurance,80 to the Incoterms for delivery
terms in international sales of goods,81 and to the Uniform Customs and Practice
for Documentary Credits (UCP).82 Forum-selection clauses and choice-of-law
clauses are likewise examples of contractual provisions that have a clear

76. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980) (discussing modern contractual relations as significantly involving
relational contracts).
77. HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (1999).
78. TEUBNER, supra note 11, at 117.
79. For example, such agreements are the foundations for most of the problem exercises for
various forms of business problems in part two of DETLEV VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS
PROBLEMS (1998).
80. SCHMITHOFF’S EXPORT TRADE: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 351–
52 (Leo D’Arcy et al. eds., 10th ed. 2000).
81. ICC, Incoterms, supra note 43.
82. ICC, UCP, supra note 43. Through contractual choice, parties can also choose provisions of
international treaties, such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, even when the treaty has not been implemented by the states
relevant to the transaction.
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governance role in specifying the venue for dispute settlement and the
background state laws that will govern the international business relation.
Finally, clauses selecting international commercial arbitration provide for
dispute settlement in an international, but nonstate, venue. A sense of
separation from state processes of governance increases as more and more of
both background substantive law and dispute-resolution procedures are subject
to private choice.
An end point in this spectrum of contract as governance in international
business relations is that a concept of self-validating contract finds Teubner’s
analysis of global merchant law without a state.83 The self-validating contract as
a vehicle for reflexive regulation in the domestic context becomes, in the crossborder context, a fundamental challenge to the relevance of sovereign law. In
particular, contract is seen as the central “legal” device that links together
transnational systems of private actors—such as among transnational business
actors or within multinational corporations—that straddle national borders and
regulate themselves, not according to any national laws, but rather according to
the autopoietic norms of the social system itself. Contract is the device not only
for self-regulation, but also for the separation of a social relation from state-law
processes.
C. Foregrounding the Transnational Nature of Private Law: Bringing Private
International Law Into Private Law
A focus on private law makes clear the sense in which private law mediates
the relationship of state law to nonstate normative orders, but viewing private
law in isolation from private international law obscures continuities of concern
in relating state private-law systems to foreign legal systems. Considering
private law and private international law together permits a greater
appreciation of the manner in which state private law has had a cosmopolitan
concern in dealing with the existence of plural orders, including foreign states.
Considering private law and private international law together also discloses
structural similarities in approach to subjects that straddle both fields, such as
treatment of arbitration clauses. Analytical habits developed in one area
influence the other. Recently, significant analysis of contract has emphasized
the degree to which private contractual relations are understood as governance
relations.84 It may be that analysis based on the relationship between sovereigns
has a larger and more pervasive influence on legal reasoning, including
respecting “private” associations.85 Ehrlich, for example, observed that “in
actual fact the entire private law is a law of associations.”86

83. Teubner, supra note 29.
84. See COLLINS, supra note 77.
85. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). For a striking
example of the parallels operating at the level of legal consciousness, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE
RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 40–43, 255–60 (1975, 2006).
86. EHRLICH, supra note 69, at 43.
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Factoring in private international law, transnational private law has not only
followed customary practice and allowed significant party autonomy respecting
articulating customized nonstate norms or incorporating such norms, but
private law appears to extend that openness to use by private parties of norms
(and processes) drawn from foreign legal systems. Three standard examples of
private-international-law questions highlight the normalcy of “foreign” norms
in private law.
First, even basic questions of jurisdiction highlight an unusually
cosmopolitan concern with foreign interests and practices. For a domestic court
to even ask this question, especially when guided only by common-law rules, is
for that court to identify the possibility of its own limits. The issue of
jurisdiction of course is more general, as in federal or municipal law.87 But in the
context of private international law, jurisdictional issues involve a state
institution responding not to any hierarchy of sovereign structures, but more to
the existence of another, parallel-level foreign legal system with connections to
a particular dispute.88 That a court might decline to hear a claim, for example,
for reasons of forum non conveniens or comity, is clearly an effort to manage
considerations of the existence of concurrent normative authorities.
Second, respecting choice of law, the unexceptional situation in which a
domestic court might assume jurisdiction but then apply the law of another
system shows an acceptance of the concurrent authority of foreign law that
defeats any parochial image of private law. That a local court might sometimes
apply foreign law makes it also much less surprising that the institution might
engage in the same application respecting developed sets of nonstate yet
transnational norms, such as those developed by particular merchant groups.
This sense of concurrent plural systems is reinforced by the possibility of mixing
different applicable laws through practices of dépeçage, permitting the
application of different laws to different parts of a complex transaction.89
Third, there has been increasing recent emphasis on the role of contractual
choice regarding questions of jurisdiction and choice of law. Forum-selection
clauses and choice-of-law clauses are now typically enforced in contemporary
private law.90 The enforcement of arbitration clauses selecting international
87. For an intriguing example, see the account of local favela law in SANTOS, supra note 9, at 134–
37. The local Residents Association engages in careful consideration of questions of jurisdiction in
dealing with both dispute prevention and dispute settlement. Through jurisdictional decisions, the local
association augments its authority, but also manages its relation to other legal authorities, here the
Brazilian state.
88. Jurisdictional issues in private international law are commonly understood as concerned with
the “vertical” relation of state to individual parties rather than the “horizontal” relation of state to
other legal systems; for a discussion of this distinction, and an identification of it as related to
differences in paradigm between the United States and Europe, see Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of
Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003 (2006).
89. See, e.g., Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations arts. 3(1), 4(1),
June 19, 1980, 1605 U.N.T.S. 80, at 81–82 (Article 3(1) states, “[T]he parties can select the law
applicable to the whole or a part only of the contract.”). In the specific context of international
contract, see PETER NYGH, AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 122–38 (1999).
90. NYGH, supra note 89.
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commercial arbitration rather than domestic civil litigation is a further
development in this direction, showing how similar policy reasoning
emphasizing the autonomy of parties and facilitating international commerce
can sustain party choice of both nonstate and foreign state processes.91
To an outside observer, these features of private international law are quite
impressive examples of tolerance in the face of plural normative orders. The
two basic questions of conflict of laws—jurisdiction and choice of law—and the
willingness to distinguish the two, evidence a modesty of private law in the face
of coexisting legal orders. This is different from a hierarchical order of
constitutional requirements respecting federalism or the division of powers,
even if some minimal requirements in the conflict of laws are sometimes found
in constitutional requirements.92 It is different as well from public international
law, in which restraints on jurisdiction and applicable law come from the
customary or conventional practice in the sovereign-state system.93 In private
law, there are far fewer hierarchical requirements to act with comity toward
other legal systems.
All of these practices reflect a sophisticated, critical disaggregation in
transnational private law of simple conceptions of sovereignty. To separately
consider matters of governing law and jurisdiction, to assign different applicable
laws to different aspects of relations, to see a role for private-party choice in
deciding these questions, are all responses to complexity that see the possibility
of creative mixing. Within this context of private international law, it is less
surprising that private law demonstrates suppleness in relation to nonstate
normative orders. An overall picture of a transnational private-law regime
emerges as concerned with the interrelationship among different normative
orders. Transnational private law appears as a regime of surprising tolerance
and of conditional cosmopolitan hospitality.94

91. Id.
92. This is true not only in the United States, but also increasingly in foreign jurisdictions. The
dramatic constitutionalization of private international law in Canada has occurred relatively recently,
through cases such as Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Can.), and Hunt v. T&N
plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 (Can.). For a discussion of these cases, see Robert Wai, In the Name of the
International: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Internationalist Transformation of Canadian
Private International Law, 39 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 117 (2001).
93. There are some relevant international treaties, most significantly the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330
U.N.T.S. 38, but the bulk of private-international-law rules are not the subject of international treaty.
In this respect, the challenges to the more ambitious effort at the Hague Conference on Private
International Law to draft an international convention on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement
of foreign civil judgments is revealing, resulting in a treaty of more limited scope, the Hague
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005; see RONALD A. BRAND & PAUL M.
HERRUP, THE 2005 HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURTS AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY
AND DOCUMENTS (2008).
94. Derrida, supra note 65, at 128.
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V
THE DELICATE BALANCE OF TRANSNATIONAL
PRIVATE LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL PLURAL ORDERING
Transnational private law has always had the task of relating state policy
and processes to other forms of social ordering. In its most successful forms, for
example with respect to letters of credit, private law has anticipated and
satisfied private-actor preferences and expectations while influencing and
guiding private ordering, customary norms, and nonstate sources. Private
ordering now includes state-law norms and processes as part of normal practice
and expectations. This is partly because of the power and utility of state law (for
example, in providing third-party enforcement and background norms), but also
because state private law has been responsive to the varied desires of privateparty participants.
In part III I argued that an important part of the space for state influence
comes because the nature of even consensual transactions is not always, over
time, one of clear cooperative benefit. Systems analyses based on shared
functional objectives diminish the degree to which potential conflict remains
pervasive, with third parties but even as between parties to consensual
transactions. Conflicts do arise, especially ex post, and are not always resolvable
in a voluntary fashion. The efficiency gains from third-party enforcement exist
because of limits on Coasean bargaining and the challenge of transactions costs,
especially given imperfections in information, incomplete insurance markets,
and limits on strategic bargaining.95 This is consistent with the observation from
critical legal studies and legal realism about the incomplete and always
contestable structure of even the most elaborated system of norms of a state
system. Teubner’s foundational self-validating contract, like a social contract
between the parties for all time and across all space, is clearly limited by the
constraints on perfect bargaining and exchange, something parties themselves
face at the moment of their first conflict. The result is that private ordering both
presents situations of conflict over contestable norms and may require a third
party to resolve disputes. State courts and norms can and do play this role.
Beyond such limits on the capacity for complete bargaining with perfect
foresight, the insights of constructivist theory must be taken on board. Many
kinds of interests and identities shift in the context of an ongoing relationship.
The idea of what constitutes interest is malleable, especially if there is
recognition of the plural identities and goals of the various participants in any
particular social system. Ideas about private interest, like ideas about national
interest, can shift through processes of normative engagement grounded in
complex social processes. The result is that law can play an important

95. DOUGLASS C. NORTH,
PERFORMANCE 27–36 (1990).
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constitutive role, including at the level of personal, group, and even national
identity.96
This constant but dynamic role of the state in formation of normative
expectations among private actors creates room for values other than strictly
facilitative ones. This is clearest in those areas of international commercial
practice in which state laws continue, even after this long period of time, to
provide important substantive rules. For example, in the area of letters of
credit, the well-established and elaborate set of customary norms of commercial
practice in the UCP are mostly silent respecting the important fraud exception,
and different state laws have developed variations on that.97 More generally, the
UCP assumes a backdrop of contract laws in various jurisdictions that
determine questions of validity of the underlying bargains between the relevant
parties.
The process of adjustment is constant and mutual. Even after absorbing
many mercantile norms into its laws, the state process must remain open to the
changing functional needs and normative expectations of business actors. To do
otherwise would be to encourage flight from the state system (either permitted
or illicit) and to discourage potentially productive private ordering. The
constrained characteristic of governance through private law is evident from its
distinct regulatory structure for enforcement. Private-law regulation is
dependent on private decisions by nonstate actors to bring claims, but also to
engage in private ordering in the shadow of the law. Because it is not
“command and control regulation,” private law depends on indirectly
influencing private ordering and claims through its structure of incentives, and
thus must ensure that its content and procedures accord with the expectations
and other priorities of private actors. This distinctive character of private-law
regulation is a source of both weakness and strength.
The delicate balance and process of mutual adjustment remains the central
challenge for private law in the transnational context. State private law should
retain a real presence in the transnational normative order by reinforcing the
understanding of participants in the various social systems that the state system
is both responsive to and constitutive of cross-border private ordering.

96. See BILL MAURER, RECHARTING THE CARIBBEAN: LAND, LAW, AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS 256 (1997).
97. ICC, UCP, supra note 43; SCHMITHOFF’S EXPORT TRADE: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 210–13 (Leo D’Arcy et al. eds., 10th ed. 2000).

